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 De Novo Banks: Regulatory Flexibility and Merger 
Activity May Not Be Enough to Spawn New Charters 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Increased de novo banking activity provides valuable services to 
communities nationwide.1  De novo banks offer credit services to the 
agricultural industry, residential mortgage borrowers, and communities 
that may otherwise find little assistance from alternative financial 
institutions.2  Additionally, by injecting energy into community banking 
sectors lacking competition, de novo banks fill important voids within 
local banking markets.3  This contribution is vital in light of a Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) report claiming that community 
banks provide 42% of small business loans nationwide.4  As such, it is no 
surprise that FDIC Chairman Jelena McWilliams suggests that a 
prosperous de novo landscape is “critical to the long-term health of the 
[banking] industry and communities across the country.”5 
Along with many other United States financial institutions, de 
novo banks faced significant hardship following the 2008 Financial 
Crisis.6  Despite efforts by federal regulatory agencies to jumpstart de 
novo banking activity, the power of these agencies to affect change is 
 
 1. Trey Sullivan, 2017 Likely to Be a Record-Breaking Year, TRUPOINT (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.trupointpartners.com/blog/de-novo-banks-2017 [https://perma.cc/BWS9-
8VWG] (describing the various benefits de novo banks bring to their respective communities). 
 2. Kylee Wooten, The Role of De Novo Banks in Community Banking, ABRIGO (Aug. 
14, 2018), https://www.abrigo.com/blog/2018/08/14/the-role-of-de-novo-banks-in-
community-banking/ [https://perma.cc/8QTA-BM85]; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DE NOVO 
BANKS: ECONOMIC TRENDS AND SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK 3 (2016), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum16/si_summer16-
article01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LJ2-ERNC]. 
 3. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 2, at 3. 
 4. Press Release, Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., FDIC Releases Report on Small Business 
Lending Survey (Oct. 1, 2018) (on file with author). 
 5. Press Release, Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., FDIC Announces Actions (Dec. 6, 2018) (on 
file with author). 
 6. See Robert M. Adams & Jacob P. Gramlich, Where Are All the New Banks? The Role 
of Regulatory Burden in New Charter Creation 2 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Divs. of Research & 
Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Working Paper No. 113, 2014), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014113pap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WE6Y-SUD6] (explaining only seven new bank charters emerged from 
2009 to 2013). 
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limited.7  Moreover, research suggests that the FDIC’s implementation 
of stricter bank regulations post-Financial Crisis played only a minimal 
role in decreased de novo bank entry.8  
At first glance, those desirous of a return to the pre-2008 de novo 
banking landscape may find hope in recent legislative efforts, including 
the Economic Growth Act and corporate tax rate cuts.9  Although such 
legislative reforms may alleviate difficulties facing de novo bank 
formation, these efforts alone are likely insufficient to reestablish pre-
2008 de novo banking numbers.10  However, de novo hopefuls should 
pay attention to movement within North Carolina’s banking industry, 
where the high volume of bank consolidation, including the largest bank 
merger in over a decade,11  could provide assistance to a barren de novo 
landscape.12 
This Note proceeds in seven parts. Part II provides a brief 
overview of recent de novo activity and two theories for the recent decline 
in new bank entry.13  Part III discusses the FDIC’s recent efforts to 
encourage new bank entry.14  Part IV assesses limitations on the FDIC’s 
 
 7. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., WHO IS THE FDIC?, 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html [https://perma.cc/G8WV-F528] (last 
updated May 3, 2017) (stating the FDIC’s primary role includes insuring bank deposits, 
overseeing bank compliance with various laws, and responding to certain bank failures). 
 8. See Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 27 (explaining that various non-regulatory 
factors likely led to at least 75% to 80% of the de novo bank decline following the Financial 
Crisis). 
 9. See Hilary Burns, The De Novo Boom Is Just Getting Started, AM. BANKER (May 7, 
2018, 12:14 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-de-novo-boom-is-just-getting-
started [https://perma.cc/3Y2M-KKFT] [hereinafter De Novo Boom] (describing the potential 
benefits of recent corporate tax rate cuts for de novo bank formation); see also Joseph C. 
Fields, Note, The Potential Effect of the Economic Growth Act of 2018 on Bank Mergers and 
Acquisitions: What This Means for De Novo Banks and CRA Lending, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 
359, 373 (2019) (explaining why the EGA’s provisions may provide incentive for increased 
de novo formation). 
 10. See Paul Davis, Bank M&A in 2019: Pace up, Premiums down, AM. BANKER (Nov. 
11, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/list/bank-m-a-in-2019-pace-up-
premiums-down [https://perma.cc/F7PK-E9NQ] (describing the EGA’s current shortfalls in 
prompting M&A activity in 2019). 
 11. Hilary Burns, Will BB&T-SunTrust Start a De Novo Wave?, AM. BANKER (Mar. 12, 
2019, 2:21 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-bb-t-suntrust-merger-start-a-
de-novo-wave [https://perma.cc/LX9G-M7CW] [hereinafter De Novo Wave] (describing the 
potential benefits of the BB&T-SunTrust merger for North Carolina’s de novo banking 
landscape). 
 12. Id.; De Novo Boom, supra note 9; Hilary Burns, Why North Carolina is De Novo 
Central, AM. BANKER (Mar. 6, 2018, 2:11 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-
north-carolina-is-de-novo-central [https://perma.cc/S2VN-D66U] [hereinafter De Novo 
Central]. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
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ability to assist in de novo bank formation, as well as congressional action 
to possibly compensate for these limitations.15  Part V analyzes North 
Carolina’s potential receptiveness to new bank entry amid changing 
conditions throughout the state’s banking landscape.16  Part VI describes 
proactive measures the FDIC and new bank management can take toward 
ensuring success in establishing and maintaining newly formed banks.17  
Part VII discusses the landscape for de novo banks going forward.18 
II.  THE RECENT HISTORY OF DE NOVO BANKING AND POSSIBLE REASONS 
FOR LOW DE NOVO FORMATION FOLLOWING THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
From 2009 to 2013, only seven new bank charters were 
established nationally,19 a sharp decline from an average of more than 
100 de novo bank formations per year from 2002 to 2008.20  These 
numbers should hardly come as a surprise, however, due to the cyclical 
nature of de novo formation.21  For instance, de novo activity surged 
throughout the economic growth periods of the early 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s; it declined following the economic downturns of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, then once again recovered as economic conditions 
improved in the mid-1990s.22   
If history continues to hold true, what goes down should come 
back up.23  In other words, history demonstrates that de novo activity 
typically decreases during recessions and fares well during periods of 
economic upswing.24  However, some feel the current scarcity of de novo 
banks is unparalleled throughout recent history,25 and the numbers 
 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part V. 
 17. See infra Part VI. 
 18. See infra Part VII. 
 19. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 2. 
 20. ROISIN MCCORD ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND, EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN 
THE NUMBER OF BANKS SINCE THE GREAT RECESSION 2 (2015), 
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_bri
ef/2015/pdf/eb_15-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2JX-5KSD]. 
 21. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 2, at 3. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. (showing the cyclical nature of de novo bank formation). 
 24. Id. 
 25. A. GEORGE IGLER & ROBERT J. ANGERER, JR., IGLER PEARLMAN P.A., COMMUNITY 
BANKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2018), http://iglerlaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Community-Banking-in-the-21st-Century.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C5NJ-K5EP]. 
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certainly support this assertion.26  For example, following the nine-month 
recession from July 1990 to March 1991, although new FDIC-insured 
commercial bank charters declined considerably from just under 150 in 
1990, the number of new charters never fell far below fifty in each year 
from 1991 to 1994, before eventually shooting up again.27  Contrast this 
to slightly under 100 new FDIC-insured commercial bank charters in 
2008, to only twenty-four in 2009,28 and practically zero for many of the 
years following.29   
As time progresses following the Financial Crisis, however, a 
gradual uptick in de novo interest is currently on pace with recent 
economic improvement.30  For instance, in 2018 the FDIC received 
twenty-four applications for federal deposit insurance—more than double 
the number of applications filed in 2017.31  Further, based on the twenty-
one applications filed by the end of 2019, the 2018 increase was more 
than just an anomaly.32  However, predicting whether this uptick in 
deposit insurance applications will actually result in a full blown de novo 
banking resurgence first requires understanding the post-2008 de novo 
bank decline.33  The two main theories proposed for the significant 
reduction in de novo bank entry following the 2008 Financial Crisis 
include: (i) new legislation resulting in increased regulatory burden on 
banks; and (ii) a weak macro economy.34 
 
 26. See Kimberly Amadeo, History of Recessions in the United States, BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/the-history-of-recessions-in-the-united-states-3306011 
[https://perma.cc/8WFT-22JA] (last updated Dec. 7, 2019) (illustrating the United States’ 
history of recessions); see also id. (graphing the number of de novo bank applications 
submitted by year throughout the United States). 
 27. Amadeo, supra note 26; IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25. 
 28. M. Szmigiera, Number of New FDIC-Insured Commercial Bank Charters, STATISTA 
(Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/193052/change-in-number-of-new-fdic-
insured-us-commercial-bank-charters/ [https://perma.cc/59ZK-GDAU]. 
 29. IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Dan Ennis, De Novo Activity Fell in 2019, BANKING DIVE (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://www.bankingdive.com/news/de-novo-activity-fell-2019-fdic/569775/ 
[https://perma.cc/86W6-CHS2]; Rachel Witkowski, Floodgates Open? De Novo Applications 
Surge at FDIC, AM. BANKER (Oct. 3, 2018, 4:34 PM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/floodgates-open-de-novo-applications-surge-at-fdic 
[https://perma.cc/T49Y-8CVY]. 
 32. See Ennis, supra note 31 (explaining that twenty-one de novo applications were 
submitted by the end of 2019). 
 33. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 2–3 (providing two theories for the post-2008 
de novo bank decline). 
 34. Id. 
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A. The Impact of Stricter Regulations Imposed on Banks Following 
the 2008 Financial Crisis 
Because de novo banks failed at approximately double the rate of 
more established banks during the Financial Crisis, the FDIC was 
criticized for its lenient deposit insurance approval standards leading up 
to 2008.35  In response, the FDIC reformed its regulatory scheme, making 
it more difficult for new banks to gain FDIC insurance.36  Such regulatory 
changes included: higher capital ratio requirements;37 increased attention 
on Bank Secrecy Act anti-money laundering requirements;38 
implementation of enterprise risk management systems;39 and greater 
emphasis on competent corporate governance.40 
Apart from imposing stricter standards on those seeking deposit 
insurance, regulations were enacted to affect the already existent banking 
industry.41  Such regulations included the Basel Committee’s increased 
capital and liquidity requirements; increased regulatory compliance 
demanded by the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act; and additional rules instituted by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau regarding mortgage lending.42  
Ultimately, the increased regulatory burden on de novo bank 
entry and activity post-Financial Crisis, combined with the banking 
industry’s uncertainty regarding the interpretation and future application 
of these regulations, may have decreased the attractiveness of chartering 
a new bank.43  
B. The Impact of a Weak Macro Economy Following the 2008 
 
 35. James M. Kane et al., Phoenix Rising: De Novo Bank Formation?, VEDDER PRICE 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.vedderbanking.com/2018/03/update-de-novo-bank-formation-
2015-2018/ [https://perma.cc/XV7G-22JA]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; Financial Institution Letter from the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. to Newly Insured 
FDIC-Supervised Depository Institutions (Aug. 28, 2019) (on file with author), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2009/fil09050.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3X6-
A6SK]. 
 38. Kane et al., supra note 35. 
 39. Id.; Financial Institution Letter from the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp, supra note 37. 
 40. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY, 2008–2013 91 
(2018), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/crisis-complete.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TGU9-6MXD]; Kane et al., supra note 35. 
 41. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 3. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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Financial Crisis 
The FDIC suggests that the de novo bank decline resulted 
substantially from influences separate from the agency’s deposit 
insurance application process.44  Similarly, a Federal Reserve Board 
(“FRB”) study on the weak, post-2008 macro economy’s effect on 
decreased de novo activity proposes that interest rates and other non-
regulatory factors likely caused at least 75% to 80% of the decline in new 
charters from 2009 to 2013.45  To explain this decline, the study identifies 
two consequences of the post-2008 macro economy responsible for lower 
banking profits: (i) a decrease in the federal funds rate; and (ii) a low 
demand for banking services.46  
First, the 2008 recession led the Federal Reserve (“Fed”) to lower 
its benchmark interest rate to a range of 0.0% to 0.25%, essentially zero, 
until December 2015 when the Fed raised interest rates to a target range 
of 0.25% to 0.5%.47  This low interest rate environment was particularly 
harmful for new banks, whose net interest margins are tied much closer 
to the Federal Funds rate than are the net interest margins of established 
banks.48  This is because newly chartered banks have no foundation of 
past loans on which they collect interest.49  Instead, these entrant banks 
primarily hold lower yielding government securities and federal funds, 
and the loans these banks issue during their early days are issued at or 
near current interest rates.50  As a result, new bank profitability post-
Financial Crisis was at the mercy of near zero interest rates.51  
 
 44. Lalita Clozel, OCC Attacks on FDIC’s De Novo Process Are off Base, Experts Say, 
AM. BANKER (Aug. 10, 2017, 1:49 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/occ-attacks-
on-fdics-de-novo-process-are-off-base-experts-say [https://perma.cc/R2LA-M9YN] (“[T]he 
FDIC and Fed have argued that the de novo drought has more to do with factors other than 
the application process at the agencies, including the low level of interest rates.”). 
 45. See Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 27 (describing the results of a study 
conducted by Federal Reserve Board members Robert Adams and Jacob Gramlich). 
 46. Id. at 2–3. 
 47. See id. at 3 (stating that a low interest rate environment emerged from the weak 
economy post-Financial Crisis); 
Kimberly Amadeo, Fed Funds Rate History with Its Highs, Lows, and Charts, BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/fed-funds-rate-history-highs-lows-3306135 
[https://perma.cc/Z6R9-T5HQ] (last updated Jan. 29, 2020); Jeff Cox, Fed Raises Rates by 
25 Basis Points, First Since 2006, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/16/fed-raises-
rates-for-first-time-since-2006.html [https://perma.cc/4Y8S-YJD7] (last updated Dec. 17, 
2015, 8:50 AM). 
 48. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 11. 
 49. Id. at 11–12. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
2020] DE NOVO RESURGENCE 371 
Second, the study reasons that decreased expansion by existing 
banks into new geographic markets signified an overall lowered demand 
among households and businesses for banking services, particularly loans 
and deposit-taking services, following 2008.52  Because both new bank 
charters and expansion by established banks reached historically low 
levels, it is unlikely that regulations affecting only de novo banks were 
primarily responsible for the overall decline in bank entry.53  In other 
words, incumbent bank expansion should not have declined to 
historically low levels solely due to the FDIC’s 2009 restrictions on de 
novo banks.54  So factors common to both established and de novo banks 
must have led to the decline in expansion.55   
Further, looking specifically at the effect of increased compliance 
costs on de novo bank formation, the Fed determined that incumbent 
banks’ non-interest costs to asset ratios remained steady throughout the 
decades leading up to its study, and that de novo banks’ ratios only 
slightly increased following 2007.56  However, it is important to note that 
since this 2007 study, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has indicated 
that smaller banks are hit harder by compliance costs than their larger 
counterparts.57  In fact, researchers found that as bank size decreases, 
relative compliance costs go up.58  For example, banks holding assets 
under $100 million claimed that, on average, approximately 10% of their 
noninterest expenses went toward covering compliance costs, while the 
study’s largest banks allocated, on average, only 5% of their non-interest 
expenses toward compliance costs.59   
III.  FDIC ACTION TO SPARK A RESURGENCE IN DE NOVO BANK 
 
 52. Id. at 4–5, 27. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 13. 
 57. Sarah Chacko, Compliance Costs Drop but Small Banks Pay More Than Big Ones, 
WSJ PRO CENTRAL BANKING (Apr. 26, 2018, 5:38 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/compliance-costs-drop-but-small-banks-pay-more-than-big-
ones-1524778738 [https://perma.cc/LS8U-THGF]. 
 58.  Id. 
 59. Id. 
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APPLICATIONS 
Ultimately, every de novo bank must procure FDIC deposit 
insurance.60  However, de novo banks have a choice on whether to apply 
for a national or state charter.61  A de novo bank pursuing a national 
charter must apply to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”), and upon approval, is supervised by the OCC and gains Federal 
Reserve System membership.62  A de novo bank pursuing a state charter 
will apply to the applicable state’s regulatory officials, and upon 
approval, is supervised by the state’s banking commission, along with 
either the Federal Reserve for state member banks or the FDIC for state 
nonmember banks.63   
Regardless of which charter is chosen, the FDIC, the Fed, and the 
OCC are all campaigning for de novo bank formation.64  For example, 
the OCC demonstrated its support by suspending the application fees for 
new bank charters in 2018.65  It is clear, however, that the FDIC has 
provided the most active support for new bank charters among the 
regulatory agencies.66  In fact, some believe that the FDIC has corrected 
a faulty de novo process.67  Whether or not the FDIC actually fixed the 
de novo process is still up for debate.68  However, the agency 
 
 60. KW Stevenson, How to Start a De Novo Bank?, BMA (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.bmabankingsystems.com/blog/2019/4/3/how-to-start-a-de-novo-bank 
[https://perma.cc/7RTU-PWKW]. 
 61. P’SHIP FOR PROGRESS, DE NOVO BANK APPLICATION PROCESS, 
https://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/start-a-bank/de-novo-bank-application-
process [https://perma.cc/S4AZ-L787] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. E-mail from Todd H. Eveson, Attorney, Wyrick, Robbins, Yates, & Ponton, to author 
(Oct. 16, 2019, 7:58 EST) (on file with author) (explaining that the Fed is pushing for de novo 
bank formation along with the FDIC); see also IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 5 (stating 
that the OCC has suspended application fees for new bank charters in 2018). 
 65. IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 5. 
 66. See Clozel, supra note 44 (“Some even argue that the FDIC is more interested in the 
formation of traditional new community banks than the OCC . . . .”); see also Monica C. 
Meinert, FDIC Launches Initiative to Encourage De Novo Formation, ABA BANKING J. (Dec. 
6, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/12/fdic-launches-initiative-to-encourage-de-
novo-formation/ [https://perma.cc/9QMF-8C5E] (outlining the FDIC’s efforts to help initiate 
de novo bank formations). 
 67. Donald Musso serves as President and CEO of FinPro, a consultancy that helps 
financial institutions apply for bank charters.  Clozel, supra note 44 (quoting Donald Musso 
saying “[t]he FDIC has fixed the de novo process”). 
 68. See id. (providing the Comptroller of the Currency’s accusations that the FDIC is 
intentionally keeping de novo banks from successfully completing the deposit insurance 
application). 
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undoubtedly implemented substantial changes in an effort to resurrect de 
novo activity, supporting one bank insider’s assertion that the FDIC is 
desperately working to attract new bank entrants.69 
As failure for de novo banks more than doubled that of smaller 
established community banks during the Financial Crisis, the FDIC’s 
deposit insurance approval standards leading up to this period were 
criticized as too lenient.70  Such alarming statistics pushed the FDIC to 
send out FIL-50-2009,71 increasing the period for heightened review of 
newly chartered banks from three years to seven years.72  During this 
seven-year period, new FDIC insured banks were required to hold greater 
capital, and experienced increased FDIC examination.73  However, the 
FDIC repealed FIL-50-2009 on April 6, 2016, consequently reducing the 
period of enhanced supervisory monitoring of newly insured depository 
institutions from seven years to three years.74  As a result, de novo banks 
must now only hold a minimum of 8% Tier 1 Leverage Capital75 for the 
first three years of operation instead of seven.76  At the very least, this 
change is symbolically significant as it parallels the pre-recession 
standard found in the FDIC Statement of Policy on Applications for 
Deposit Insurance.77 
The FDIC also began taking measures in 2014 aimed toward 
promoting greater transparency throughout the deposit insurance 
 
 69. Meinert, supra note 66; Hilary Burns, Will De Novo Activity Pick up in 2019? Don’t 
Bet on It, AM. BANKER (Dec. 21, 2018, 1:33 PM) [hereinafter De Novo 
Activity], https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-de-novo-activity-pick-up-in-2019-
think-again [https://perma.cc/KZ2P-FAGU]. 
 70. Kane et al., supra note 35. 
 71. The FDIC’s Financial Institution Letter titled “Enhanced Supervisory Procedures for 
Newly Insured FDIC-Supervised Depository Institutions.”  Financial Institution Letter from 
the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 37. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Kane et al., supra note 35; Clozel, supra note 44. 
 75. A bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio is its core capital (i.e., disclosed reserves and common 
stock) divided by its risk-weighted assets (bank assets weighted by credit risk).  Mitchell 
Grant, Tier 1 Capital, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tier1capital.asp 
[https://perma.cc/9DZ4-5QEN] (last updated May 6, 2019). 
 76. IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 2. 
 77. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC STATEMENT OF POLICY ON APPLICATIONS FOR 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3000.html 
[https://perma.cc/3KEE-UTAN] (last updated Apr. 20, 2014) (“Normally, the initial capital 
of a proposed depository institution should be sufficient to provide a Tier 1 capital to assets 
leverage ratio . . . of not less than 8.0% throughout the first three years of operation.”); see 
also IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 3 (explaining that prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis 
the de novo period lasted for three years instead of seven); Kane et al., supra note 35, at 2. 
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application process.78  For example, the FDIC issued Deposit Insurance 
“Questions and Answers” to help applicants better comprehend the steps 
required to complete the federal deposit insurance application.79  Further, 
in 2017, the FDIC issued a handbook designed to guide applicants 
through the federal deposit application process.80  The FDIC also 
established outreach meetings in several regions throughout the country 
for those seeking a de novo charter.81  These meetings identify helpful 
resources for applicants and provide an overview of the FDIC’s 
application review procedures.82   
Along with encouraging greater transparency throughout the 
application process, the FDIC provided applicants ample opportunity to 
improve the strength of their applications before officially submitting 
them for review.83  Specifically, new deposit insurance applicants may 
now receive instructive feedback on a draft application from FDIC staff 
members before filing their formal application.84  
Lastly, the FDIC requested feedback on other ways to enhance 
the deposit insurance application process, demonstrating its dedication to 
continuous improvement.85  For example, the FDIC posed specific 
questions to commenters asking what changes the FDIC could make to 
the application process for traditional community banks.86 
The FDIC has not been alone in its efforts to combat the de novo 
shortage.87  The American Bankers Association (“ABA”) provided the 
 
 78. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 2, at 7 (describing the purpose and use of 
the FDIC Deposit Insurance “Questions and Answers” (Q&As) issued in November 2014). 
 79. Id.; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE RELATED TO THE FDIC 
STATEMENT OF POLICY ON APPLICATIONS FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE (2016), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2016/fil16024.html [https://perma.cc/W5YC-
ZUSB]. 
 80. Kane et al., supra note 35. 
 81. Daniel H. Burd & John J. Spidi, FDIC Holds De Novo Outreach Conference, 
MARTINDALE (NOV. 16, 2016), https://www.martindale.com/banking-financial-
services/article_Jones-Walker-LLP_2237152.htm [https://perma.cc/EF3J-D8TM]. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Meinert, supra note 66. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON THE FDIC’S DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE APPLICATION PROCESS 8, 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2018/pr18095a.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPP9-3T3X] 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2020). 
 87. See Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations on Enhancing De Novo Process, 
ABA BANKING J. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/08/banker-task-force-
shares-recommendations-on-enhancing-de-novo-process/ [https://perma.cc/CJ2W-RN4G] 
(describing the role of the banker task force in encouraging de novo bank formation). 
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FDIC with a “banker task force,” a group of bank leaders with former de 
novo experience aiming to alleviate difficulties facing de novo 
formation.88  The task force recently offered its proposed solutions to 
Chairman Jelena McWilliams, and cited regulatory issues as a significant 
issue in the de novo process.89  Specifically, the “banker task force” 
pointed to the overall length of the application process as a remaining 
hindrance.90  The FDIC’s guidelines for processing a new bank’s deposit 
insurance application present a sixty-day and 120-day time frame for the 
expedited and standard procedures, respectively.91  However, because the 
processing clock only begins when the application is deemed 
“substantially complete,” it takes longer than sixty days to get an 
application approved in practice.92  FDIC guidelines mandate that the 
case manager reviewing the federal deposit insurance application should 
determine whether an application is “substantially complete” within 
thirty days after receipt.93  However, according to one bank expert, an 
application is rarely determined to be “substantially complete” 
immediately after filing.94  Therefore, even if the case manager reviews 
the application within thirty days after receipt, the application may not 
qualify as “substantially complete” until after thirty days, ultimately 
lengthening the application process.95 
IV.  THE FDIC’S SHORTCOMINGS AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
SEEMINGLY ENHANCING THE PROBABILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL DE NOVO 
RETURN 
Notwithstanding these FDIC efforts, there are still substantial 
obstacles for starting a new bank that fall outside of the FDIC’s control, 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., GENERAL APPLICATION PROCESSING TIMEFRAMES FOR 
REGIONAL OFFICES, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/applications/application-processing-
timeframes.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRF6-5S3C] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020). 
 92. DIV. OF RISK MGMT. SUPERVISION, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
APPLICATIONS: PROCEDURES MANUAL 11 (2019), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/applications/depositinsurance/procmanual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CS6M-Y2EQ]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. E-mail from Todd H. Eveson, supra note 64. 
 95. DIV. OF RISK MGMT. SUPERVISION, supra note 92; see also E-mail from Todd H. 
Eveson, supra note 64 (explaining that it generally takes longer than sixty days to gain 
application approval in practice). 
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starting with high capital requirements. 96  In fact, many within the 
banking community believe the high capital requirements present the 
most substantial hindrance to de novo formation.97  However, the ABA’s 
task force explained that believing these capital requirements can be 
lowered, in itself, presents an obstacle in the de novo formation process.98  
Recently, successful applicants gathered anywhere from $20 million to 
$40 million to meet their capital requirements.99  One bank insider 
illustrates the difficulty of satisfying such requirements, describing the 
likelihood of finding $20 million to start a bank in a 5,000-person town, 
for example, as very low.100   
Difficulty in hurdling high capital barriers is exacerbated by the 
current interest rate climate.101  An investor’s decision to fund, and 
therefore, a bank’s ability to enter a market, is determined by expected 
profits to be earned from entry.102  From an investor’s perspective, the 
lending business likely appears unappealing with interest rates currently 
“squeezed,” resulting in a low net interest margin.103  These potential 
investors will likely find little solace in the current Federal Reserve 
Board, whose members clearly hold differing opinions regarding what 
 
 96. Clozel, supra note 44. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations, supra note 87. 
 99. R. Alan Deer, De Novo Banks on the Rise, BRADLEY (November 20, 2018), 
https://www.financialservicesperspectives.com/2018/11/de-novo-banks-on-the-rise/ 
[https://perma.cc/LJB5-MUVX]; see Paul Schaus, It’s Not Enough to Fix the De Novo 
Application Process, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Oct. 9, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/its-not-enough-to-fix-de-novo-application-
process [https://perma.cc/Q2ZL-N9RX] (stating that although “[t]here’s no minimum capital 
requirements that can serve as a guidepost,” many recent applicants consider raising “at least” 
$15 to $20 million). 
 100. Clozel, supra note 44 (quoting David Baris, a partner at Buckley Sandler, who 
illustrates the difficulties associated with meeting capital requirements in a smaller town). 
 101. See Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that de novo banks’ returns on 
loans dwindle during low interest rate periods); see also Smart Things to Know About Sources 
of Income for a Bank, ECON. TIMES, 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/save/smart-things-to-know-about-sources-of-
income-for-a-bank/articleshow/54377370.cms [https://perma.cc/X4GJ-RWJK] (last updated 
Sept. 19, 2016, 6:30 AM) (describing interest earned on loans as the primary source of income 
for commercial banks). 
 102. Steven A. Seelig & Tim Critchfield, Merger Activity as a Determinant of De Novo 
Entry into Urban Banking Markets 9 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Working Paper No. 1, 2003). 
 103. Wayne Abernathy, Actual Change in De Novo Policy Proving Hard for FDIC, AM. 
BANKER: BANKTHINK (Sept. 6, 2016, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/actual-change-in-de-novo-policy-proving-hard-
for-fdic [https://perma.cc/JM8S-MHMY]. 
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direction the federal funds rate should go.104  As of late September 2019, 
the Federal Reserve cut interest rates a quarter point, to a target range of 
1.75% to 2%, before again lowering the bench mark interest rates to the 
current range of 1.5% to 1.75%.105  If further cuts are in store, net interest 
margins—particularly for new banks—are certain to continue suffering 
as a result.106  
Nevertheless, bank profitability should increase following the 
recent corporate tax rate cuts.107  Investors, then, may be more accepting 
of risks associated with de novo banks if there is potential for higher after-
tax returns on equity investments from capital gains.108  Further, for 
corporations investing in de novo banks, lower marginal rates result in 
smaller personal tax payments, which frees up additional money for 
investment.109  Ultimately, it would appear that investors should be better 
able and more incentivized to invest in a more profitable banking industry 
following the corporate tax cut.110  However, the corporate tax rate cuts 
do not help banks profit any more than other companies benefiting from 
the lower corporate tax rate. 111  Therefore, because in the short-term new 
banks, particularly in a low interest rate environment, suffer from low net 
interest margins, and in the long-run the net interest margin is at the 
mercy of a federal funds rate controlled by an unpredictable Fed, 
investors may be more inclined to invest in non-bank institutions.112   
 
 104. Victoria Guida, Divided Fed Cuts Rates a Notch, POLITICO, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/18/federal-reserve-cuts-interest-rates-1501881 
[https://perma.cc/3B4U-MMN3] (last updated Sept. 18, 2019, 4:41 PM).  
 105. Id.; Jeanna Smialek, Federal Reserve Cuts Interest Rates for Third Time in 2019, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/business/economy/federal-reserve-interest-rates.html 
[https://perma.cc/U77B-MKS2]. 
 106. See Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 12 (“[N]ew banks have greater exposure to 
current interest rates, while incumbent banks have diversified portfolios of loans and 
securities with varying yields and interest rates (and have lower holdings of federal funds).”). 
 107. Burns, supra note 9 (describing the beneficial role of recent tax reform on the 
likelihood of new bank formation and profitability). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (quoting Tony Plath, a finance professor at the University of North Carolina at 
Charlotte, stating “[t]ax reform helps create the sort of economic environment and investor 
climate that favors the creation of more startup banks, especially in states that are healthy, 
growing and business-friendly”). 
 111. See David Floyd, Explaining the Trump Tax Reform Plan, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/taxes/trumps-tax-reform-plan-explained/ 
[https://perma.cc/D9C4-MGL7] (last updated Jan. 20, 2020) (explaining that the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act (TCJA) benefits both banks and “other” corporations). 
 112. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 12; see Guida, supra note 104 (characterizing 
the Federal Reserve as “divided” regarding monetary policy).  
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When considering the above, in combination with the detrimental 
impact compliance costs can have on a smaller bank’s profitability, it 
appears logical that investors may choose to forgo investing in a de novo 
bank.113  However, through the Economic Growth Act (“EGA”) enacted 
in May of 2018, efforts are being made to lower these compliance 
burdens.114  In fact, North Carolina’s first community bank entrant in a 
decade, American Bank & Trust, categorized the EGA in their offering 
circular as “an attempt to provide regulatory relief to smaller . . .  financial 
institutions.”115  Whether directly or indirectly, the EGA has the potential 
to assist the de novo banking industry.116   
First, Title II of the EGA contains provisions directly assisting 
community banks through deregulation.117  For example, upon the EGA’s 
enactment, community banks are not subject to the Volcker Rule,118 
including its bans on proprietary trading.119  The EGA also contains 
provisions aimed at simplifying capital rules for community banks,120 and 
Section 101 of the Act provides community banks greater freedom when 
making decisions regarding its lending practices.121  In addition to these 
benefits, community banks holding under $5 billion in total consolidated 
assets are subject to more lenient reporting requirements, and banks 
 
 113. See Floyd, supra note 111 (stating the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) benefits both 
banks and “other” corporations); see also Chacko, supra note 57 (describing the 
disproportionate effect of compliance costs on smaller banks). 
 114. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
115–174, § 203, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (providing “[c]ommunity bank relief” under § 203 of 
the Act); see also Fields, supra note 9, at 373 (describing the Economic Growth Act’s 
potential benefits for de nov o bank formation). 
 115. Caroline Hudson, Charlotte Region’s Startup Bank, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (May 21, 
2019, 2:33 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/2019/05/21/charlotte-regions-
startup-bank-becomes-ncs-first.html [https://perma.cc/5PDF-9E4V]; AM. BANK & TR., 
OFFERING CIRCULAR (2018). 
 116. See Fields, supra note 9, at 373 (stating that increasing the SIFI threshold should push 
BHCs with total assets slightly below $50 billion into acquiring de novo banks); see also 
Richard M. Alexander et al., Passage of the Economic Growth Act, ARNOLD & PORTER (June 
1, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/06/passage-of-
the-economic-growth-act-modifies [https://perma.cc/7X7G-QFUT] (listing the EGA 
provisions providing direct regulatory relief for community banks). 
 117. See Alexander et al., supra note 116 (describing the “community bank relief” 
provided under § 203 of the EGA). 
 118. The Volcker Rule prohibits banks from participating in various types of speculative 
investments. James Chen, The Volcker Rule, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/volcker-rule.asp [https://perma.cc/29L4-G4S8] (last 
updated Dec. 9, 2019). 
 119. Alexander et al., supra note 116. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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holding under $3 billion in total consolidated assets may extend the 
length of time in between regulatory examinations from twelve months 
to eighteen months.122    
Second, looking to the EGA’s indirect effects, prior to the EGA’s 
enactment, financial institutions with $50 billion or more in total assets 
were automatically labeled systemically important financial institutions 
(“SIFI”).123  However, Section 165 of the EGA raised the $50 billion 
threshold at which an institution is automatically labeled a SIFI to $250 
billion.124  It is no surprise that bank holding companies sought to avoid 
this SIFI designation due to the additional regulatory costs associated 
with it.125  Therefore, bank holding companies were less willing to 
undertake M&A activity that pushed them above the $50 billion mark.126  
Now that financial institutions can surpass this $50 billion threshold 
without receiving the SIFI label, however, financial institutions with 
slightly less than $50 billion in total assets are in a prime position for 
M&A activity.127  
Theoretically, a friendlier M&A environment is great news for 
the de novo banking landscape for two reasons.128  First, due to 
“personnel efficiencies and consolidations,” senior officers of acquired 
banks normally sell their stock and lose their jobs.129  Therefore, as 
mergers increase, once these senior officers’ non-compete agreements 
expire, they can use their banking experience and capital to form their 
own de novo banks.130  Second, investor optimism, and therefore, 
incentive for formation, should increase as newly formed banks are more 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
115–174, § 165, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (substituting the $50 billion threshold for SIFI 
designation with $250 billion); see Fields, supra note 9, at 360 (explaining that Section 165 
of the EGA raised the SIFI designation threshold from $50 billion to $250 billion). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See David C. Ingles & Sven G. Mickisch, Increase in SIFI Threshold Should Spur 
More Bank M&A Activity,  SKADDEN (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/04/quarterly-insights/increase-in-sifi-
threshold-should-spur-more-bank [https://perma.cc/B232-C8VN] (explaining that bank 
holding companies labeled as SIFIs face “stricter oversight and more burdensome regulatory 
requirements, including the Federal Reserve Board’s enhanced prudential standards”). 
 126. Id. (stating that the EGA’s provisions should lead bank holding companies 
“benefiting from this legislation . . . to take a renewed interest in M&A . . . .”). 
 127. Fields, supra note 9, at 368. 
 128. See id. (explaining the benefits of a friendlier M&A environment for the de novo 
banking landscape). 
 129. Id. at 373. 
 130. Id. 
380 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 24 
likely to be acquired by bank holding companies, now able to increase 
their total assets above $50 billion without fear of SIFI designation.131  
Despite these theoretical benefits, although still in its early days, 
as of November 1, 2019, the EGA has not yet proven effective in 
promoting bank sales for premiums.132  In fact, a little over a year after 
the EGA’s enactment, premiums have fallen.133  Through November 1 of 
both 2018 and 2019, premiums averaged 174% and 155% of a seller’s 
tangible book value for that year, respectively.134  Further, 2019 data 
indicates that the EGA has not yet spurred M&A activity as some 
predicted.135  Excluding BB&T’s merger with SunTrust, the aggregate 
value of bank M&A deals dropped 19% from November 2018 to 
November 2019.136  In fact, leading up to November 2019, under 10% of 
sellers in these merger deals held over $1 billion in assets.137  Considering 
over 90% of merger deals have involved the sale of banks holding less 
than $1 billion in assets, it is unlikely these acquiring banks moved to 
make such minimal additions to their total assets because of the $200 
billion dollar increase in the SIFI designation threshold.138  In other 
words, with such a relatively minimal increase in assets, it is likely the 
acquiring bank could have made such an acquisition prior to the EGA’s 
enactment and remained under the SIFI designation.139  
V.  NORTH CAROLINA’S FUTURE DE NOVO BANKING LANDSCAPE 
Ultimately, those looking to enter the banking industry may find 
that buying an already existing bank presents a cheaper and easier route 
than going through the de novo charter process.140  In fact, North 
 
 131. Id. at 368. 
 132. Davis, supra note 10. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. (comparing M&A activity throughout the banking industry in 2018 to that in 
2019). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. (explaining that the majority of bank sellers involved in 2019 M&A deals held 
a relatively low value of assets). 
 139. See id. (explaining that the majority of bank sellers involved in 2019 M&A deals held 
a relatively low value of assets). 
 140. See Jeff Gerrish, Can America Grow New Banks Again?, BANKING EXCHANGE (Jan. 
25, 2017, 4:53 PM), http://m.bankingexchange.com/blogs-3/community-banking-
blog/item/6677-can-america-grow-new-banks-again [https://perma.cc/JPJ4-ZU52] (listing 
the advantages of buying an established bank as opposed to applying for a de novo bank 
charter); see also Ken McCarthy, Proposed North Carolina De Novo Withdraws Application, 
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Carolina’s banking industry exemplifies the difficulties associated with 
starting a de novo bank.141  As of May 2019, the state has only witnessed 
one de novo bank, American Bank & Trust, successfully established 
within the past decade.142  By contrast, the state’s banking industry 
experienced several de novo applications withdrawn.143  These 
withdrawals are likely attributed to difficulties in raising adequate 
capital.144  Such difficulties are particularly onerous when multiple de 
novo efforts are concentrated in one geographic area, as there are only so 
many potential investors available.145  Consequently, Spirit Community 
Bank in Statesville, Dogwood State Bank in Raleigh,146 and Community 
Bank of the Carolinas in Winston-Salem,147 all withdrew their charter 
applications.  Looking specifically at Dogwood State Bank, in May of 
2019, Dogwood State withdrew its application with the North Carolina 
Office of the Commissioner of Banks and the FDIC, electing to instead 
recapitalize Sound Bank in Morehead City, NC.148   
Nevertheless, North Carolina’s Chief Deputy Commissioner of 
Banks, Rowe Campbell, explained that the recent increase in bank 
consolidation throughout North Carolina opened up the market for de 
novo entry.149  Despite North Carolina’s de novo difficulties, the numbers 
certainly appear to support this assertion, as North Carolina lost half of 
 
AM. BANKER (June 28, 2019, 2:12 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/proposed-
north-carolina-de-novo-withdraws-application [https://perma.cc/6SBV-F2UF] (explaining 
that those who backed Raleigh’s Dogwood State Bank eventually chose to buy an established 
bank rather than submit a de novo charter application). 
 141. Hudson, supra note 115 (stating that North Carolina has seen only one de novo bank 
successfully established in the past decade). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Hilary Burns, De Novo Activity’s up, but Organizers Face Familiar Obstacles, AM. 
BANKER (Jan. 24, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/de-novo-
activitys-up-but-organizers-face-familiar-obstacles [https://perma.cc/8JLP-SGH6] 
[hereinafter Obstacles]. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Signs of Life in De-Novo Bank Activity, BAUER FIN. (June 10, 2019), 
https://www.bauerfinancial.com/2019/06/10/signs-of-life-in-de-novo-bank-activity/ 
[https://perma.cc/YVL4-ZHUR]. 
 147. McCarthy, supra note 140. 
 148. Joshua Recamara, Dogwood State Bank Withdraws Application, S&P GLOBAL (Nov. 
30, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/trending/O3L0MPm8ZkUjCR6JgzKDMA2Sanchez- [https://perma.cc/8JT9-3UJC]; 
Aaron Sánchez-Guerra, Sound Bank Becomes Dogwood State Bank, NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct. 
7, 2019, 04:07 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article235820492.html. 
 149. See De Novo Central, supra note 12 (“We’ve had so much consolidation—there’s 
definitely a market, a need and a desire [for community banking] in a lot of the 
communities.”).   
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its banks since 2010.150  Within the past three years alone, the North 
Carolina banking industry witnessed the sale of several regional banks to 
larger, out-of-state competitors.151  Among the regional banks lost 
include: BNC Bancorp of High Point, Yadkin Financial Corp. of Raleigh, 
Capital Bank Financial Corp. of Charlotte, and Great State Bank of 
Wilkesboro.152 
One bank insider explained that North Carolina’s increased 
merger activity and subsequent community banking void has left business 
and community leaders longing for a return of local management 
complementary to community banking.153  This is welcome news for de 
novo hopefuls, particularly when considered alongside the fact that many 
of the community banks chartered in the period prior to the 2008 
Financial Crisis came about in markets undergoing bank consolidation.154  
If one bank insider is correct in his assertion that witnessing success in 
establishing a de novo charter will persuade others to try establishing 
their own bank, then American Bank & Trust could be the first of many 
new bank entrants.155  
Some view BB&T’s merger with SunTrust Bank, the largest 
merger announced in over a decade, as a potential precursor to a 
resurgence in North Carolina’s de novo banking activity, particularly on 
the heels of recent FDIC regulatory changes. 156  Certainly this merger 
will add to the already pervasive consolidation striking North Carolina’s 
banking industry,157 but the impact of this megamerger remains 
unclear.158  Bank customers who feel degraded to a nameless number are 
 
 150. De Novo Boom, supra note 9. 
 151. Richard Craver, Consolidation Spurs Renewed Interest in Startup Community Banks, 
WINSTON-SALEM J. (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.journalnow.com/business/consolidation-
spurs-renewed-interest-in-startup-community-banks/article_2b3ce350-bfc4-5d9d-a8da-
516564e1916f.html [https://perma.cc/S9MD-WJ55]. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Yan Lee & Chiwon Yom, The Entry, Performance, and Risk Profile of De Novo 
Banks 2 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 3, 2016), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2016/wp2016/2016-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC6J-
SMVX] (finding that many of the de novo charters established from 2000 to 2008 formed in 
markets undergoing bank mergers or acquisitions). 
 155. See De Novo Boom, supra note 9 (pointing to the potential benefits of a successfully 
established de novo bank for the rest of the de novo banking landscape). 
 156. De Novo Wave, supra note 11. 
 157. See Craver, supra note 151 (illustrating instances of recent bank consolidation within 
North Carolina). 
 158. De Novo Wave, supra note 11 (describing the potential effects of the BB&T-SunTrust 
merger on North Carolina’s de novo banking landscape). 
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more likely to cease their relationship with that bank.159  Therefore, 
generally, it is the larger competitor bank buying the smaller community 
bank that triggers local investors to reestablish the personal touch of a de 
novo bank that is often lost in a larger bank.160  However, the BB&T-
SunTrust merger presents different circumstances.161  In terms of total 
assets, BB&T and SunTrust are currently the thirteenth and fourteenth 
largest banks in the United States, respectively, and each hold 
approximately $165 million in total customer deposits.162  Although the 
BB&T-SunTrust merger will produce the sixth largest bank in the United 
States,163 customers of each bank are likely already familiar with this type 
of large bank relationship.  Therefore, it may be more likely that Truist 
customers will find themselves used to the level of customer service 
presented, allowing the merged bank to retain its former BB&T and 
SunTrust customers.164 
Despite uncertainty regarding customer reaction to the BB&T-
SunTrust merger, as the largest merger announced in over a decade,165 
efficiency considerations will likely push senior officers of both BB&T 
and SunTrust out of the newly formed Truist, and once these senior 
 
 159. The Banking Customer Experience Report, QUALTRICS, 
https://www.qualtrics.com/customer-experience/banking-report/ [https://perma.cc/XQ59-
57XX ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (“[C]ustomers will leave within 14 months if they don’t 
have a good experience, and 56% of customers looking to leave say their bank hasn’t made 
an effort to keep them from switching.”); see also Shep Hyken, Businesses Lose $75 Billion 
Due to Poor Customer Service, FORBES (May 17, 2018, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/shephyken/2018/05/17/businesses-lose-75-billion-due-to-
poor-customer-service/#6ccba13c16f9 [https://perma.cc/4KGL-EHE9] (providing the results 
from NewVoiceMedia’s 2018 report stating that 67% of customers will consider switching 
“brands” due to unpleasant customer service). 
 160. Craver, supra note 151 (quoting Lee Burrows, chief executive of Banks Street 
Partners of Atlanta, stating “[i]t is that time in the life cycle of community banks that many 
of the community banks have merged with other larger organizations, leaving business and 
community leaders desirous of a local bank with local decision makers”). 
 161. See Erin Oneil, The Biggest Banks in the United States, BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/the-big-4-us-banks-315130 [https://perma.cc/3BKL-7BRY] 
(last updated Nov. 20, 2019) (showing that Branch Banking & Trust Corp. and Sun Trust 
Banks Inc. represent the thirteenth and fourteenth largest banks in the United States, 
respectively). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Ben Lane, Truist Is Here, HOUSING WIRE (Dec. 9, 2019, 1:41 PM), 
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/truist-is-here-bbt-suntrust-complete-merger/ 
[https://perma.cc/PM3W-ABX3]. 
 164. Kyle Nazario, These Are the 5 Largest Banks in America, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION (June 12, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/business/these-are-the-largest-banks-
america/Hk2QNM6nQdZTwNlLxvn8EM/ [https://perma.cc/DQ55-6NYZ] (stating that 
Truist will be the sixth-largest bank in the United States); Gerrish, supra note 140. 
 165. De Novo Wave, supra note 11. 
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officers’ non-compete agreements expire, they can use their banking 
experience and capital to form their own de novo banks.166  Such 
expectations are reflected in one bank expert’s analysis that the logical 
candidates to start de novo banks in North Carolina are the market 
presidents or city executives from BB&T or SunTrust.167  So ultimately, 
it appears at least some industry participants feel this merger could serve 
as a catalyst for a resurgence in North Carolina de novo banking 
activity.168  
VI.  ACTIONS THE FDIC AND NEW DE NOVO BANK MANAGEMENT 
SHOULD TAKE TO ENSURE A NEWLY ESTABLISHED BANK’S SUCCESS 
The FDIC has arguably been successful in promoting initial 
investor interest in the prospect of acquiring a new bank charter.169  Since 
the FDIC demonstrated its newfound willingness to accept de novo bank 
applications for FDIC insurance in 2016,170 this upswing in interest has 
shown in the numbers.171  In fact, the FDIC received more applications 
in 2016 than in the four prior years combined.172  The FDIC must now 
consider the proposals of the ABA banker task force to ensure de novo 
success past just the application submission stage.173  Specifically, the 
FDIC must clarify expectations regarding how long application review 
will take; consider reconfiguring the rate cap constraining de novo banks, 
as the current rate cap174 prevents their ability to attract deposits; make 
clear that the FDIC’s de novo manual will determine capital 
requirements; and establish a de novo team at the FDIC focused solely 
on overseeing applications.175  
 
 166. Fields, supra note 9, at 373; see also De Novo Wave, supra note 11 (explaining that 
former BB&T or SunTrust officers represent probable candidates to establish de novo banks). 
 167. De Novo Wave, supra note 11. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Clozel, supra note 44 (describing the “demonstrated uptick in interest for new 
bank charters” amid FDIC promotional activity and regulatory changes). 
 170. Kane et al., supra note 35. 
 171. See Clozel, supra note 44 (stating that the FDIC received eight applications in 2016). 
 172. Id. (stating that the FDIC received eight applications in 2016). 
 173. See Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations on Enhancing De Novo Process, 
supra note 87 (describing the banker task force’s recommendations to the FDIC for promoting 
de novo bank expansion). 
 174. THE INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., ICBA POLICY RESOLUTION, 
https://www.icba.org/advocacy/policy-resolutions/brokered-deposits-and-the-fdic’s-
national-deposit-rate-caps [https://perma.cc/MU3T-6HVY] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). 
 175. Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations on Enhancing De Novo Process, supra 
note 87. 
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The FDIC should also use its supervisory role to ensure the 
stability of de novo banks once they are established.176  To do this, the 
FDIC must monitor risk-taking behavior and encourage proper risk 
management procedures.177  The FDIC could additionally consider 
limiting de novo reliance on non-core sources of funds, an influential 
factor in recent de novo failures, as well as limiting loan concentration.178  
Apart from setting limits, the FDIC should continue educating new 
banking institutions on relevant issues, through analysis such as that 
found in the FDIC’s issuing of “Managing Commercial Real Estate 
Concentration.”179   
Along with FDIC action, de novo bank management should take 
steps both during the business planning stage and once their new bank is 
established to ensure a healthy existence.180  As discussed above, many 
bankers currently consider the high capital requirement the most 
substantial hindrance in the de novo formation process.181  However, a 
2018 Igler and Pearlman review explains that reconfiguring a bank’s 
growth plan may reduce this apprehension regarding capital 
requirements.182  This is because a conservative growth plan 
encompassing realistic goals over an institution’s first three years 
requires less capital than a more aggressive growth strategy, since the 
amount of capital needed is a fraction of the bank’s asset size and 
 
 176. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 7 (explaining that the FDIC presides over 
approximately four thousand banks and savings banks for “operational safety and 
soundness”). 
 177. Lee & Yom, supra note 154, at 14 (describing the negative impact excessive risk-
taking had on de novo banks formed in advance of the 2008 Financial Crisis). 
 178. See id. (characterizing those de novo banks dependent upon non-core funding and 
investing deeply in C&D lending prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis as “financially fragile” 
compared to their “small established” counterparts). 
 179. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
CONCENTRATIONS, 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin07/article02_real_
estate.html [https://perma.cc/ZW42-82KW] (last updated Dec. 7, 2007) (providing banks 
with valuable information regarding commercial real estate lending). 
 180. See Paul Nadler, De Novo Banks Need Top Talent, Not Just Cash Series: 6, AM. 
BANKER (Jan. 4, 1987), https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/docview/292867607?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:summon&accoun
tid=14244 [https://perma.cc/9KRJ-986H] (recommending the steps necessary for maintaining 
a healthy de novo bank); see also IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 4 (explaining the 
positive impact that forming a “realistic plan for growth” has on a de novo bank’s chances for 
success). 
 181. Clozel, supra note 44 (“Bankers, meanwhile, said the biggest obstacle is neither 
the de novo application process nor interest rates, but the high capital requirements for 
institutions.”). 
 182. IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 4. 
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composition.183  Therefore, a business plan that projects the bank will 
reach $300 million in assets within its first three years will necessitate 
much greater capital than more realistic projections to reach $150 million 
to $200 million in assets.184  
Finally, upon the de novo bank’s establishment, management 
should make sure to: (i) hire better talent, even if it means paying higher 
salaries; (ii) maintain a close-knit board passionate about their role both 
within the bank and greater community; (iii) select a competent chief 
executive officer familiar with the area; (iv) garner enough capital 
initially to maintain the ability to make significant loans and withstand 
the early years of little to no profit without having to raise additional 
capital in order to comply with examiners’ requirements; and (v) lastly, 
remember that success in receiving a charter does not necessarily equate 
to success as a bank.185  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, the rate of new bank entry 
throughout the United States plummeted. 186  Whether this decline 
resulted from increased regulatory oversight throughout the banking 
industry, or from non-regulatory factors such as interest rates, 187 the 
FDIC and Congress are working to reignite de novo formation. 188  
However, if high capital requirements currently present the most 
substantial hindrance in successful de novo entry, 189 the FDIC and 
Congress, although able to spur interest in applying for new bank 
charters, are fairly limited in their ability to assist in actual de novo 
formation. 190  Therefore, those looking to enter the banking industry may 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Nadler, supra note 180. 
 186. MCCORD ET AL., supra note 20. 
 187. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
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 189. Clozel, supra note 44. 
 190. See Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations on Enhancing De Novo Process, 
supra note 87 (explaining that believing these capital requirements can be lowered in itself 
presents an obstacle in the de novo formation process); see also Obstacles, supra note 143 
(explaining that difficulties in raising capital are exacerbated when multiple de novo efforts 
are concentrated in one geographic area); see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 7 
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find that buying an already existing bank presents a cheaper and easier 
route than going through the de novo charter process.191  However, if a 
de novo resurgence is to occur, its best chance of success likely lies in 
states such as North Carolina, where bank consolidation has left a 
substantial void in the community banking market. 192  
 
TYLER G. TALTON* 
 
 
(stating that the FDIC’s primary roles include insuring bank deposits, overseeing bank 
compliance with various laws, and responding to certain bank failures); see also Floyd, supra 
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